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mined with microbial identification and susceptibility testing 
systems (Vitek 2; bioMerieux). During the second phase of 
the outbreak, swab samples were cultured on minimal mineral 
broth with acetate, a medium selective for Acinetobacter spe-
cies.10 Because the epidemic strain was resistant to ciproflox-
acin, this medium was supplemented with 32 mg/L of cip-
rofloxacin (Ciproxin; Bayer AG) to further increase its 
specificity. All A. baumannii isolates recovered during the 
outbreak, from either patients or the hospital environment, 
were typed by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) as de-
scribed elsewhere.11 
A burn patient was infected with Acinetobacter baumannii on transfer 
to the hospital after a terrorist attack. Two patients experienced 
cross-infection. Environmental swab samples were negative for A. 
baumannii. Six months later, the bacteria reemerged in 6 patients. 
Environmental swab samples obtained at this time were inoculated 
into a minimal mineral broth, and culture results showed widespread 
contamination. No case of infection occurred after closure of the 
unit for disinfection. 
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2007; 28:723-725 
Acinetobacter baumannii recently gained interest as a cause 
of dirty wound infection, particularly in mass casualties.1"4 It 
is also a hospital-acquired pathogen that is predominantly 
found in the intensive care setting.5,6 Its propensity to per-
sistently contaminate the hospital environment7 and to be-
come resistant to most available antibiotics is a major con-
cern.8'9 We describe an outbreak of infection related to an 
index patient who was transferred to a burn intensive care 
unit (BICU). This outbreak was characterized by 2 distinct 
phases in its evolution and by widespread environmental 
contamination. 
M E T H O D S 
The BICU had 3 isolation rooms for burned patients and 1 
bay of 4 beds for nonburned surgical intensive care unit 
patients. No A. baumannii had been cultured from BICU 
patients during the 4 years that preceded the outbreak. From 
October 2002 to December 2004, the patients involved in the 
outbreak were identified from the results of microbiology 
specimens obtained for clinical management. Screening cul-
tures were not formally performed because many specimens 
were regularly available, independent of any formal screening 
culture protocol. 
To assess environmental contamination during the first 
phase of the outbreak, we used swab samples inoculated into 
brain-heart infusion enrichment broth and subcultured onto 
MacConkey agar. Suspected A. baumannii colonies were fur-
ther identified and their susceptibility patterns were deter-
RESULTS 
First phase. The index patient, whose burns resulted from 
the October 12, 2002, bombing in Bali, was transferred to 
the BICU 4 days later and isolated under contact precautions 
(Figure 1). On the day of transfer, A. baumannii was cultured 
from wound biopsy specimens, from the tips of 3 intravas-
cular catheters, and from sputum specimens. The isolate was 
fully susceptible only to carbapenems and amikacin. 
Two of 3 consecutive burned patients became infected with 
a strain of A. baumannii that had the same PFGE profile. 
This was not the case for 113 nonburned patients who stayed 
in the BICU during the same period. 
We collected environmental swab samples from the hy-
drotherapy room, because it was shared by burned patients 
only, but found no A. baumannii. Transmission precautions 
were reinforced. A single cohort of nurses took care of all A. 
baumannii-positive patients. No additional case of infection 
occurred among the 14 burned patients admitted to the hos-
pital during the 6 following months. 
Second phase. After this interruption, 6 of 9 consecutive 
burned patients were infected with A. baumannii, but again 
none of the 91 nonburned patients was infected. We obtained 
161 swab samples from the environment, which this time 
were cultured on minimal mineral broth with acetate sup-
plemented with ciprofloxacin. A. baumannii was recovered 
from 16 (10%) of 161 swab samples, mostly from the hy-
drotherapy room and a patient's room. The environmental 
strains and the patients' strains had a PFGE profile that was 
indistinguishable from that of the isolate recovered during 
the first phase of the outbreak (Figure 2). 
We implemented more stringent and extensive cleaning 
procedures, including a ban against stockpiling any material 
in the rooms and a requirement to replace unused, exposed 
material after each procedure in the hydrotherapy room and 
the operating room, and daily in the patients' rooms. Finally, 
the BICU was closed to new patients until the last A. bau-
mannii-Tpositive patient could be discharged to the regular 
ward (ie, for 2.5 months). As a consequence, admission had 
to be denied to 9 burned patients who were transferred to 
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FIGURE i. Time distribution of Acinetobacter baumanniiinfection 
in the 9 burn unit patients in the outbreak. Bar, length of stay in 
the unit for 1 patient involved in the outbreak. Diamonds, first 
occurrence of A. baumannii^positive culture results {open diamond, 
index case; closed diamonds, secondary cases). 
another burn center. Before reopening, the BICU underwent 
an extensive chemical-mechanical disinfection, and material 
and equipment were sterilized, disinfected, and/or replaced. 
Control swab samples collected from environmental surfaces 
were negative for A. baumannii at that time and again 8 
months thereafter. No new case of infection due to A. bau-
mannii occurred among the 32 burn patients admitted during 
the 18-month follow-up period after the BICU reopened. 
D I S C U S S I O N 
This case series illustrates that hospitals are vulnerable to 
importation of A. baumannii when patients are transferred 
from other hospitals,12 from a battlefield, or from the scene 
of a mass catastrophe.2 4 Similar to the index patient, several 
survivors of the terrorist attack in Bali were colonized with 
A. baumannii.1 
The patients who were infected with A. baumannii in this 
outbreak were hospitalized for significantly longer periods 
because of delayed wound healing. Three patients experienced 
septic shock-related bowel perforation, which was fatal for 
one of them (data not shown). 
Most outbreaks caused by A. baumannii have involved in-
tensive care unit patients,7 particularly burn patients.13"15 In 
our series, A. baumannii not only did not cause infection 
outside the BICU, but it was never recovered from nonburned 
surgical ICU patients treated in the BICU. This observation 
suggested the hypothesis that the burned patients shared a 
common exposure. Indeed, debridement surgery and hydro-
therapy were examples of invasive procedures that these pa-
tients underwent in the same rooms. 
We were unable to demonstrate contamination of the en-
vironment during the first phase of the outbreak, similar to 
26 (51%) of 51 A. baumannii epidemics described in the 
literature from 1977 through 2000.5 Environmental contam-
ination may have been absent or minimal during this phase. 
Alternatively, it is possible that this contamination was not 
documented because the first-phase investigation was less in-
tensive than that during the second phase or because the 
brain-heart infusion enrichment broth that was used during 
the first phase was not sufficiently sensitive to detect A. bau-
mannii in the environment. We eventually found a fairly dis-
seminated contamination of the environment when we used 
minimal mineral broth with acetate10 during the second 
phase. Contamination of material and surfaces was obvious 
in patients' rooms and in the hydrotherapy room. One may 
consider patients undergoing hydrotherapy at high risk for 
environmental contamination, because hydrotherapy is as-
sociated with moisture and high temperature in the room, 
droplet dispersion, and intensive handling of anesthetized 
patients with large, contaminated wounds, which create nu-
merous opportunities for breakdowns in contact precautions. 
The receipt of hydrotherapy was indeed an independent risk 
factor for A. baumannii bloodstream infection in burn pa-
tients in a study by Wisplinghoff et al.15 The presence of A. 
baumannii on boxes of an emergency drug (norepinephrine) 
illustrates the importance of complying with isolation pre-
cautions even under critical circumstances. 
We have no clear explanation of how and where the A. 
baumannii epidemic strain persisted between the 2 phases of 
the outbreak. We could not find any change in care proce-
dures or in the population of either patients or healthcare 
workers that could represent reexposure to a persisting source. 
A persisting environmental source was not looked for during 
the interval between the 2 phases, because we assumed that 
the problem was resolved at that time. The known propensity 
of A. baumannii to persistently contaminate surfaces is a likely 
explanation for the resurgence of the outbreak.15,17 
Events of this kind illustrate that even hospitals without 
endemic A. baumannii are at risk of importing this bacterium 
via transfer of patients. Microbiological screening is advisable 
for patients transferred from endemic areas, battlefields, or 
the scenes of mass catastrophes, along with strict infection 
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FIGURE 2. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns after digestion 
with restriction enzyme Apal of DNA from Acinetobacter baumannii 
isolates from 6 of the 9 patients (lanes 1 -6) and from the environment 
(lanes 7-17). M, molecular markers. 
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control measures. If secondary cases occur, the detection of 
environmental contamination by use of a minimal mineral 
broth with acetate may help guide measures to interrupt 
transmission. 
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